Abstract

In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, ie, mechanisms which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.

Abstract

Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishonest ones. In this work, we introduce selective and cumulative fairness. We characterize a mechanism as fair if it satisfies both notions and present FaRM, a representative mechanism we designed. FaRM is a Nash incentive mechanism that focuses on information aggregation for spontaneous local activities which are accessible to a limited number of agents without assuming any prior knowledge of the event. All the agents in the vicinity observe the same information. FaRM uses (i) a report strength score to remove the risk of random pairing with dishonest reporters,(ii) a consistency score to measure an agent’s history of accurate reports and distinguish valuable reports,(iii) a reliability score to estimate the probability of an agent to collude with nearby agents and prevents agents from getting swayed, and (iv) a location robustness score to filter agents who try to participate without being present in the considered setting. Together, report strength, consistency, and reliability represent a fair reward given to agents based on their reports.

Abstract

Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishonest ones. In this work, we introduceemph {selective} andemph {cumulative} fairness. We characterize a mechanism as fair if it satisfies both notions and present FaRM, a representative mechanism we designed. FaRM is a Nash incentive mechanism that focuses on information aggregation for spontaneous local activities which are accessible to a limited number of agents without assuming any prior knowledge of the event. All the agents in the vicinity observe the same information. FaRM usestextit {(i)} aemph {report strength score} to remove the risk of random pairing with dishonest reporters,textit {(ii)} aemph {consistency score} to measure an agent's history of accurate reports and distinguish valuable reports,textit {(iii)} aemph {reliability score} to estimate the probability of an agent to collude with nearby agents and prevents agents from getting swayed, andtextit {(iv)} aemph {location robustness score} to filter agents who try to participate without being present in the considered setting. Together, report strength, consistency, and reliability represent a fair reward given to agents based on their reports.

Abstract

The emergence of e-commerce and e-voting platforms has resulted in the rise in the volume of sensitive information over the Internet. This has resulted in an increased demand for secure and private means of information computation. Towards this, the Yao's Millionaires' problem, ie, to determine the richer among two millionaires' securely, finds an application. In this work, we present a new solution to the Yao's Millionaires' problem namely, Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC). We show that PPC achieves this comparison in constant time as well as in one execution. PPC uses semi-honest third parties for the comparison who do not learn any information about the values. Further, we show that PPC is collusion-resistance. To demonstrate the significance of PPC, we present a secure, approximate single-minded combinatorial auction, which we call TPACAS, ie, Truthful, Privacy-preserving Approximate Combinatorial Auction for Single-minded bidders. We show that TPACAS, unlike previous works, preserves the following privacies relevant to an auction: agent privacy, the identities of the losing bidders must not be revealed to any other agent except the auctioneer (AU), bid privacy, the bid values must be hidden from the other agents as well as the AU and bid-topology privacy, the items for which the agents are bidding must be hidden from the other agents as well as the AU. We demonstrate the practicality of TPACAS through simulations. Lastly, we also look at TPACAS'implementation over a publicly distributed ledger, such as the Ethereum blockchain.

Abstract

A smart grid is an efficient and sustainable energy system that integrates diverse generation entities, distributed storage capacity, and smart appliances and buildings. A smart grid brings new kinds of participants in the energy market served by it, whose effect on the grid can only be determined through high fidelity simulations. Power TAC offers one such simulation platform using real-world weather data and complex state-of-the-art customer models. In Power TAC, autonomous energy brokers compete to make profits across tariff, wholesale and balancing markets while maintaining the stability of the grid. In this paper, we design an autonomous broker VidyutVanika, the runner-up in the 2018 Power TAC competition. VidyutVanika relies on reinforcement learning (RL) in the tariff market and dynamic programming in the wholesale market to solve modified versions of known Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations in the respective markets. The novelty lies in defining the reward functions for MDPs, solving these MDPs, and the application of these solutions to real actions in the market. Unlike previous participating agents, VidyutVanika uses a neural network to predict the energy consumption of various customers using weather data. We use several heuristic ideas to bridge the gap between the restricted action spaces of the MDPs and the much more extensive action space available to VidyutVanika. These heuristics allow VidyutVanika to convert near-optimal fixed tariffs to time-of-use tariffs aimed at mitigating transmission capacity fees, spread out its orders across several auctions in the wholesale market to procure energy at a lower price …

Abstract

The high rate of churning users who abandon the Community Question Answering forums (CQAs) may be one of the crucial issues that hinder their development. More personalized question recommendation to users might help to manage this problem better. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm (we name HRCR) that recommends questions to users such to reduce their churning probability. We present our algorithm in a two-fold structure: First, we use Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to uncover the users’ engagement states inside a CQA. Second, we apply a Reinforcement Learning Model (RL) to recommend users the questions that match better with their engagement mood and thus help them get into a better engagement state (the one with the least churning probability). Experiments on a large-scale offline dataset from Stack Overflow show a meaningful reduction in the churning probability of the

Abstract

In this report, we aim to exemplify concentration inequalities and provide easy to understand proofs for it. Our focus is on the inequalities which are helpful in the design and analysis of machine learning algorithms.

Abstract

Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, eg in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. In this paper, we perform an equilibrium analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as ACPR, and find it intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response for a bidder with complete information in a single-shot double auction with ACPR. Leveraging the theory developed for single-shot double auction and taking the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA as our testbed, we proceed by modeling the PDA of PowerTAC as an MDP. We propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that MDPLCPBS follows the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the-art bidding strategies for the PowerTAC wholesale market PDAs, and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently.

Abstract

Modeling affect via understanding the social constructs behind them is an important task in devising robust and accurate systems for socially relevant scenarios. In the CL-Aff Shared Task (part of Affective Content Analysis workshop @ AAAI 2019), the organizers released a dataset of ‘happy’ moments, called the HappyDB corpus. The task is to detect two social constructs: the agency (i.e., whether the author is in control of the happy moment) and the social characteristics (i.e., whether anyone else other than the author was also involved in the happy moment). We employ an inductive transfer learning technique where we utilize a pre-trained language model and fine-tune it on the target task for both the binary classification tasks. At first, we use a language model pre-trained on the huge WikiText-103 corpus. This step utilizes an AWDLSTM with three hidden layers for training the language model. In the second step, we fine-tune the pre-trained language model on both the labeled and unlabeled instances from the HappyDB dataset. Finally, we train a classifier on top of the language model for each of the identification tasks. Our experiments using 10-fold cross validation on the corpus show that we achieve a high accuracy of ∼93% for detection of the social characteristic and ∼87% for agency of the author, showing significant gains over other baselines. We also show that using the unlabeled dataset for fine-tuning the language model in the second step improves our accuracy by 1-2% across detection of both the constructs.

Abstract

Cross-lingual summarization (CLS) aims to create summaries in a target language, from a document or document set given in a different, source language. Cross-lingual summarization can play a critical role in enabling cross-lingual information access for millions of people across the globe who do not speak or understand languages having large representation on the web. It can also make documents originally published in local languages quickly accessible to a large audience which does not understand those local languages. Though cross-lingual summarization has gathered some attention in the last decade, there has been no serious effort to publish rigorous software for this task. In this paper, we provide a design for an end-to-end CLS software called clstk. Besides implementing a number of methods proposed by different CLS researchers over years, the software integrates multiple components critical for CLS. We hope that this extremely modular tool-kit will help CLS researchers to contribute more effectively to the area.